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NO HELP WANTED.
MEDICAL RESEARCH EXCHANGE BETWEEN RUSSIA
AND THE WEST DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
by
E. H. BEARDSLEY*
EVERYONE with some familiarity with the history of World War II is aware that
relationships between the Soviet Union and her Western Allies were tenuous at
best. On major issues, such as Russian aid requests and the launching of a second
front, major disputes arose. Not as well known is the fact that that same discord
alsomarkedthelesserwartimerelations. Acaseinpointweretheefforts oftheU.S.A.,
Canada, and GreatBritain to exchange valuable medical andhealthinformationwith
the Russians. Throughout the war, Moscow was not onlyunwillingto commitherself
to any permanent system ofsharing but was at times reluctant even to take from the
West medical information and techniques she badly needed.
The story ofAllied medical relations is equally instructive as to the state ofAnglo-
American co-operation, which was clearly far fromperfect. Where the Russians were
concerned, America and Britain were often careless ofeach other's national interests
and sensibilities, almost to the point ofcompeting for Russia's favour. Each nation,
but particularly the British, had a high opinion of its own creativity in medical
research and was resentful ofthe other's seeming willingness to pass itself offto the
Russians as the leader ofmedical science in the West.
Problems between Washington and London, of course, were minor ones and
resulted mostly in annoyance. Difficulties with Russia, on the other hand, were more
significant because they probably impeded the Soviets' ability to wage war. Had
Moscow been less suspicious ofherWestemallies and morewillingto acceptmedical
help from the West-and it is likely that Britain and America could have benefited
from moreinformation from Russia-itwas entirelypossible that a larger number of
Soviet soldiers and civilians could have survived the Russian War.
Almostimmediately after the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941, Great Britain
and the U.S. began efforts to set up a permanent medical exchange with the Soviet
Union. Each country at that time had its own reasons for wanting a Russian con-
nexion, but both were convinced of the military value of such exchange. Britain,
who had stood alone against the Germans since thefall ofFrance, wasconcernedto
do everything shecould to sustain Russianresistance. Oneproblemthe Soviets faced,
which especially concerned British medical and military leaders, was the threat of
typhus among Soviet soldiers andcivilians. Although the Russians denied the danger
and maintained that they had the situation under control, the British knew that was
not so. Entomologist P. A. Buxton, an expert in the international health field, stated
E. H.Beardsley, Ph.D.,AssociateProfessorofHistory,TheUniversity ofSouthCarolina,Columbia,
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flatly that "epidemic typhus, spread by lice and no other way, is at this moment
[October 1941] a grave threat to the populations ofEastern Europe and otherplaces.
An outbreak might not only cause a vast amount ofdisease and death but also dis-
locate the transport, supplies offood, and the whole ofwhat is generally called the
'war effort'."' Exchanging medical personnel with the Soviets, the British thought,
wouldbeaninoffensive wayto getthe Russians to accepttheexperthelptheyneeded.
The Americans, who were not to enter the war until December 1941, had a less
pressing interest in medical collaboration, but they were still eager to share Russia's
findings in the field of military medicine. Aviation medicine was one area in which
the Soviets had made large strides. John Fulton, Yale physiologist and assistant head
of the Division of Medical Sciences of the National Research Council, admitted to
being "much impressed by the material that has come out of Russia ... during the
past four or five years. It must mean that they have much more unpublished. Ifwe
exchange information with them, I don't believe for a moment that it will be a one-
way exchange . .."1.2
Acting on the premise that the Russians would be as interested in exchange as the
West, London and Washington, jointly, in the summer of 1941 asked the Soviets
if they would be willing to receive an Anglo-American mission, as a prelude to a
systematic interchange, to discuss a broad range of medical and health topics."
Three months later, the Russians replied. They had no objection, to exchangeper se,
butforthepresentthemilitarysituationwas toocriticaltoallowattentiontoanything
else. England's ambassador to Russia, Archibald Clark-Kerr, added a warning that
Whitehall should not consider sending the mission unilaterally because it "would
not be welcome [to the] Soviet Government at present."'
For over a year the matter lay dormant. Then, in December 1942, the Soviets
unexpectedly reopened the issue. Professor Sergei Yudin, a leading Russian surgeon,
proposed to his friend, the British ambassador, that England and America each
send three orthopaedic surgeons to the U.S.S.R. to observe Russian methods of
treating battlefield fractures. The ambassador quickly relayed the invitation to
London and offered to put the Americans in the picture, as well, by informing their
embassy in Moscow.5
Although Yudin's proposal narrowed the scope ofexchange considerably, British
medical leaders responded eagerly, for a surgical mission would at least put Western
scientists into Russia, and once there they could push for expanded interchange."
Others outside the medical sphere were also interested. The previous September,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill had persuaded the Russians to agree to a general
1 P. A. Buxton to D. T. Richardson, 3 October 1941, Papers of the War Office, WO 32/9797,
Public Record Office, London (hereinafter, WO and PRO). On Buxton see Who's Who, London,
A. & C. Black, 1955, p. 436.
' John Fulton to A. V. Hill, 25 August 1941, file 3123, v. iii, Medical Research Council Papers,
London (hereinafter, MRC); on Fulton see Who's Who in America, 24th ed., Chicago, Marquis
Who's Who, 1946, p. 827.
' Fulton to Hill, 25 August 1941, f. 3123, v. iii, MRC.
'His Majesty's Ambassador (Kuibyshev) to Foreign Office, 17 November 1941, Memo 69, CAB
90/2, Papers oftheCabinet, PRO; also seeSummary ofCorrespondence for 1941, WO 32/9797, PRO.
'J. G. Crowther to Sir Edward Mellanby, 17 December 1942, f. 3132/4, MRC.
Mellanby to R. W. Watson-Jones, 31 December 1942, f. 3132/4, MRC.
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scientific and technical exchange, but thus far the Soviets had not upheld their end
ofthe bargain. The Yudin proposal raised hopes in the Foreign Office that Moscow
had decided to be more open. The surgical mission, in fact, might prove to be the
catalyst ofa freer flow ofscientific information.7
Anyone who dealt with the Russians, though, quickly learned not to let his hopes
climb too high and to expect frequent changes of the Soviet heart. The proposed
surgicalmission was acaseinpoint. Inearly February 1943 Professor Yudin informed
the British ambassador that London and not he must take the initiative for the
mission. Then, aweeklater, Yudindropped out ofthepicture altogether, andmedical
leaders in London began to see no "immediate prospect ofa visit takingplace."8
But with equal suddenness, there was another shift. In March, Soviet Foreign
Secretary V. I. Molotov informed Ambassador Clark-Kerr that Russia would be
happy to receive a surgical mission, although that time Moscow did not mention the
Americans. BuoyedbythenewsofRussia'schangeofheart, theBritishmovedspeedily
to get things ready.
The task oforganizng the mission fell chiefly to Sir Edward Mellanby, Secretary
of the Medical Research Council and chief medical adviser to the War Cabinet.
Acquainted with the whims of Russian diplomacy, Mellanby was determined to
avoid any delay which might give the Russians time to change their minds.9
The first task was to select personnel. Asking for a representative from each ofthe
Services, Mellanby was satisfied with every nominee except the candidate from the
Air Ministry, Air Commodore Stanford Cade. Cade's inclusion, Mellanby feared,
would hold up the mission's departure, because as a naturalized British subject of
Russian origin, hewouldbe suspectin Moscow. As Mellanby explained, the Russians
"are extremely touchy on . . . bringing people of Russian birth back to Russia at
the present time and make a special point of finding out whether such people have
ever had any relation to the White Russian Party."10 The Air Ministry agreed to a
replacement, and by mid-April the mission's departure seemed imminent.
Then, an unforeseen problem arose. Somehow the Americans had never learned
of the Soviets' December offer nor of any of the later negotiations. Perhaps Clark-
Kerr or the Foreign Office had been at fault, or perhaps the British ambassador's
original communiqu6 to American ambassador William Standley had been mislaid.
But whatever the cause, it was only in April that Standley discovered the existence of
an impending mission and informed the State Department ofit."1
On the scientific agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Britain, see E. H. Beardsley, 'Secrets
between friends: applied science exchange between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union during
World War II', Social Studies ofScience, 1977, 17: 447473; see also Brigadier Crew to Mellanby,
c. 17 January 1943, f. 3132/4 MRC.
' Mellanby to Watson-Jones, 9 February 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC; also see HM Ambassador
(Moscow) to Mellanby, 3 February 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC.
' Draft letter, Mellanby and Henry Dale to Royal Navy Medical Service Directors, 26 March
1943, f. 3132/4 MRC; A. H. Jones to Mellanby, 1 April 1943, f. 3132/4 MRC; on Mellanby, see
Who's Who, London, A. & C. Black, 1945, p. 1869.
10 Mellanby to Air Vice-Marshal Sir Harold Whittington, 13 April 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC; also
Mellanby and Sir Henry H. Dale to RN Medical ServiceDirectors, 26 March 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC.
"1American Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary of State, 11 April 1943, Committee on Medical
Research, General Records, "Russia" file, Record Group 227, National Archives, Washington,
D.C. (hereinafter, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227).
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Washington was caught completely by surprise. Diplomatic and medical leaders
not only had known nothing of Britain's negotiations but also had been forming
plans oftheir own, as the result ofa separate inquiry from the Russians two months
before. In February 1943 the Soviet Foreign Office had asked General Philip R.
Faymonville, U.S. Lend-lease co-ordinator in Moscow, ifthe Americans could supply
them with information on treatment of phosphorus burns and of wounds from the
poisonous gases, Lewisite and Yperite. In addition, the Soviets inquired about
American interest in sharing information on surgery, chemical defence, and epi-
demiology, but without mentioning the on/off surgical mission.12
Keenly interested in sharing Russia's vast experience in battlefield medicine and
havingjust suffered a Russian rejection ofa visit to Moscow by an American typhus
commission, the Americans werejubilant over the report ofFaymonville's conversa-
tion. During the next few weeks, members of the Committee on Medical Research
(CMR), America's counterpart to the Medical Research Council, had been busy
planning ways to capitalize on Russia's new-found spirit ofco-operation. When news
of the British surgical mission reached them, CMR chairman A. N. Richards and
his colleagues, alongwithofficials ofthe State Department, werejust abouttopropose
a general exchange ofsecret research information, to be coupled with the visit of an
American expert. The projected mission was also to include representation from
Canada and Great Britain."3 Obviously, those plans now had to wait.
In London Mellanby was equally surprised by the mixup, although at first there
was some American unwillingness to believe it. The U.S. ambassador in London,
John Winant, who had also just learned about the mission, believed that Mellanby
had purposely kept the U.S. in the dark and called on him to tell him that and to
insist on American representation. Mellanby responded rather huffily, that the
ambassador's suspicions were totally misplaced, that he had said nothing to Winant
earlier simply because he was sure the Americans had been informed. In any case,
he said, it was not his "job to keep in touch with political and diplomatic circles.""4
As for American representation, Mellanby told Winant that while he would
normally welcome U.S. participation, he doubted whether there was time to arrange
it in the present case. If the mission did not leave soon, Moscow would infer that
the British were not serious and might cancel all visas.'5 But when Winant promised
to move swiftly, Mellanby relented.
Selecting an American delegation was no problem at all. General Paul R. Hawley,
chief American surgeon in Europe, had two professors of surgery on his London
staff, so he simply asked them to go. The two were Colonel Elliott Cutler, formerly
professor of surgery at Harvard Medical School, and Lt. Colonel Loyal Davis, a
neurosurgeon from Northwestern University, who was to represent the CMR. In
" American Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary ofState, 21 February 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ",
RG 227.
"I Onthedevelopment ofmissionplans seeEdward R. Stettinius to Henry L. Stimson, 27 February
1943; Vanevar Bush to Edward R. Stettinius, 8 March 1943; WilderPenfield to Stettinius, 11 March
1943; and Cordell Hull to Bush, 31 March 1943, all in CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227. On the
typhus mission see American Embassy, Moscow, to Secretary of State, 11 April 1943, CMR, Gen
Rec, "Russ", RG 227.
14 Mellanby, Note on interview with U.S. ambassador Winant, 16 April 1943, f. 3132/4 MRC. 16 Ibid.
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May, Canadianneurosurgeon WilderPenfieldjoinedthelist, representinghiscountry's
Medical Research Council.16 So by the time the mission finally departed in early
July 1943 (delayed not by the Americans but by flight safety problems), it had grown
into a tri-nation enterprise.
Hoping to exchange information on many topics beyond the field of surgery-on
typhus, for example-the three governments were also determined to make the sur-
geons' visit thefirst step towards a permanent medical exchange with the Russians.
To whet Moscow's interest in such an accord, the British were even prepared to share
highlysecretmedicalinformationwiththeirSovietallies.17
Not even a good offer, though, was always sufficient to win Russian backing, so
when the group of surgeons arrived in Moscow, they were not sure what kind of
reception awaited them. Their initial session with Soviet health and medical officials
was encouraging. When British naval surgeon Gordon Gordon-Taylor suggested a
tour of base and front-line hospitals, Commissar of Health Georgii Miterev readily
agreed. When Gordon-Taylor asked, further, if Russian and Western doctors would
be allowed to discuss research questions, his host again assured him that that would
be arranged. The Americans concluded the happy session by presenting the Russians
with two million units ofpenicillin, the first of the new antibiotic they had seen."8
But ifthe visit started well, relations between visitors and hosts soon deteriorated
and finally collapsed completely. An omen of impending problems was the micro-
phone that the American doctors discovered in the gilt trim oftheir hotel mirror. It
also became clear that they would not be allowed to go anywhere or talk to anyone
without their two "shadows", Professors Koreisha and Rufanov, the first a respected
scientist but the latter merely a Communist Party hack. Morever, Russian medical
scientists practically ignored their visitors. In meetings, Soviet surgeons neither asked
questions nor answered them, andwiththe exception ofProfessor Yudin, nonecalled
at the mission's hotel headquarters. When Yudin visited, he came late at night and
tapped on a table throughout the conversation to foil the bugging device.1'
Clearly, Russian doctors were afraid to make contact, a result, in part, of their
government's decision to limit discussion strictly to fractures. But their timidity was
also rooted in the atmosphere offear and suspicion that pervaded Russian science.
As British delegate Ernest Rock Carling observed, "on many subjects there is an
official opinion, and ... it is unwisefor any Professor or Doctor to express a contrary
1 Ibid.; Gordon Gordon-Taylor, 'The Anglo-American-Canadian Surgical Mission to Russia,
July, 1943', Br. J. Surg., 1944, 31: 205-207; on CMR involvement, see Richards to Dean Acheson
17 April 1943, CMR, Gen Rec. "Russ", RG 227; onPenfield, see Penfield to Sir Henry Dale, 8 May
1943, f. 3132/4, MRC.
1 On plans to broaden the mision, see MRC to C. R. Harrington, 28 April 1943, f. 3132/4,
MRC; also 'Outline for basis ofexchange ofconfidential medical information between theU.S.S.R.
and the Research Councils ofthe U.S., Great Britain, and Canada,' 31 May 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC;
on Britain's willingness to give away its secrets see W. L. Burnes to A. L. Thomson, 14 June 1943,
f. 3132/4, MRC; on the flight delay see R. Watson-Jones, to Mellanby, c. 15 June 1943, f. 3132/4
MRC.
i 'Report of the initial meeting with U.S.S.R. public health, academic, and military medical
officers', 5 July 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC.
1 Loyal Davis, 'Surgical mission to Russia', [n.d.], unpublished typescript in possession of the
author; also see Davis, 'Neurological surgery', in Activities of surgical consultants, Washington,
D.C., Office ofthe Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1964, vol. 2, p. 426.
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view."'0
One official opinion, apparently, was that Soviet medicine was so effective that
problems in the treatment and control of disease simply did not exist. Certainly, it
was impossible to find an official who would admit the presence of any epidemic.
Yet according to Westerners who had seen conditions first-hand, problems were
legion. Major John F. Waldron, a U.S. Army Medical Corps doctor assigned to the
staff of Faymonville, the Co-ordinator of Lend-Lease in Moscow, had served in
Russia since 1941. Waldron's practice included the American diplomatic and military
colony, as well as resident Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Poles, and his experiences
up to the summer of 1943 suggested that health conditions were desperate. Typhus,
according to Waldron, remained a major and unsolved problem; tularaemia was
"epidemic along most of the front"; and malaria was "rampant from the Black
SeatotheArctic". YetepidemicswereonlythebeginningofRussia'sproblems. Acase
inpoint was nutrition. According to Waldron, "thelowerclasses are literallystarving.
Gross evidence ofavitaminosis is seen everywhere.""2l
In view ofsuch conditions, Moscow's prohibitions on open discussions made little
sense to the Western surgeons, who soon began to wonder why the Russians had
invited them in the first place. The best explanation they could find was that Moscow
merely wanted to parade Russian surgical technique and to prove that communist
medicine had caught up with that in the capitalist West. Vice-Commissar of Health
Sergei Kolesnikov, for one, was eager to know what his visitors thought of Russian
military surgery and questioned them at length about their views. Admittedly, Russia
had lagged far behind the West in World War I, but in the last twenty-five years, he
proclaimed, the Soviets had made great improvement. The Russians' continuous
posturing and preening reminded American Loyal Davis of the antics of ten-year-old
boys "who brag about the size of their houses and chimneys and recklessly claim
that their fathers can lick anyone."22
Only at the last session, on the eve of their departure, did the Westerners get the
Russian scientists to lower their guard and engage in more open discussion. Taking
advantage ofthe opening, they urged the Russians to considerjoining the system of
exchange which Canada, the U.S., and Britain had inaugurated and which included
routine sharing of research reports and the maintenance by each country ofmedical
liaison offices in the capitals of the others. Vice-Commissar Kolesnikov admitted
privately that he was interested in sharing medical secrets without constant govern-
ment censorship, and his view seemed to be that ofother Soviet professionals. But if
Russian doctors were eager for a liaison, Carling and the others knew that the
10 Carling to J. F. A. Burke, 5August 1943, N4481, FO 371/36929,PRO; alsosee Carling,'Report
of British-American surgical mission to the U.S.S.R.", 17 September 1943, f. 3132, MRC. On the
narrow limits placed on the talks see Standley's interview with Molotov, in American Embassy,
Moscow, to Secretary of State, 11 April 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227. Molotov feared
that broader discussions, especially on questions of epidemics, might cause panic among civilians.
"1 K. B. Turner, Conversation with MajorJohn F. Waldron, 8 July 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ",
RG 227.
"Carlig, 'Second Interview with the People's Commissar (Public Health)', 3 August 1943,
f. 3132/4, MRC; also Davis, 'Neurological surgery', op. cit., note 19 above, p. 439. Although the
American and British delegates did not talk to Waldron (he was in Washington at the time of the
mission), they did confer with others in the American colony in Moscow, who shared Waldron's
concern. Thus, the visitors would most surely have been aware ofexisting conditions.
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"unknown factor is the government control", and that any Soviet participation in
medical exchange depended on approval by higher authorities.23
The mood in London following the return of the mission was understandably
gloomy, for the assessment was that the trip had been a failure.4 But in Washington
quite another attitude prevailed. There, medical leaders and State Department
officials chose to overlooktheproblems oftheJuly mission andto concentrateinstead
on the more promising prospect of a broad-based research exchange, hinted at by
the Russians in February 1942. The mission whichfailed, after all, had been a British
venture, and there was no cause for American discouragement over that.
Actually, the Americans had never stopped preparing for the other mission. In
mid-July, while Allied surgeons were still in Moscow, Harvard President James
Conant, then serving as assistant head of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development (theparent agency ofthe CMR), wrote to Mellanby and to his counter-
part in Canada, C. J. MacKenzie, telling them of Russia's interest in exchanging
information with the U.S. on a wide range of medical topics, including research.
The U.S., Conant said, had decided to propose a visit to Moscow by an American
expert, who would take with him information on ten important topics in the field of
warmedicine. SincetheBritishand Canadians hadcontributed much ofthatinforma-
tion, Conant wanted to obtain their approval of the plan before Washington went
further. In addition, Conant told Mellanby and MacKenzie that he would welcome
British and Canadian participation in such a mission.25
The British reacted to Conant's proposal with both puzzlement and annoyance.
A few days after Conant's letter reached London, Mellanby got the first gloomy
reports ofthe July mission, and he was at a loss to understand how the Americans
could take so rosy a view ofa situation that the Britishperceived as an utter disaster.
Misinterpreting Conant to say that the Russian overture to them came during the
July visit, Mellanby and his associate, Carling, concluded that the Americans had
simply read more into the friendly attitudes of Russian surgeons at the last Moscow
meeting than was warranted. Agreeing that no proposal from Soviet doctors con-
stituted a serious offer until it received approval from the Soviet government,
Mellanby and Carling felt strongly that Washington should wait until the Russians
responded to the exchange proposal that Carling, Davis, and Penfield had already
made in July before taking any further initiatives.26
The Foreign Office viewed the American plans with outright annoyance. The
July mission had been ajoint enterprise, as well it should have been in view of the
joint origin ofAlliedresearch, yetthe U.S. was nowtrying to move offindependently,
and that did not impress Whitehall. C. E. Wilson of the Foreign Office spoke for
hiscolleagues whenhe saidthat "it seems apitythat weshouldhave to moveforward
" Interviw between Davis, Penfield, and Carling and Vice-Commissar ofPublic Health, f. 3132/4,
MRC.
" Mellanby to Conant, 10 August 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC.
" Conant to Mellanby, 14 July 1943, N3381, FO 371/36929, PRO.The subjects on which Conant
wanted to inform the Russians were: (1) British anti-Lewisite; (2) penicillin; (3) typhus vaccine;
(4) plasma proteins; (5) atabrine; (6) surgical infections, bums, shock; (7) insect repellents; (8)
fungus infections; (9) prevention ofinfection by use ofaerosols; (10) goggles.
" Mellanby to Conant, 10 August 1943, f. 3132/4 MRC; Carling to Burke, 5 August 1943, N4481,
F0371/36929, PRO.
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under the wing of the Americans."27 Not only that but the Russians, Whitehall
felt, were "sour at the presenttime" and would not be receptive to any overture from
the West. Urging a new project on them would not only be futile but would also hurt
that mission's chances.28
In August, Mellanby, who fully shared the pique ofthe Foreign Office, replied to
Conant. With admirable restraint, he told Conant that he was "surprised to know
how successful you had been in developing your plans." While he had no reason to
doubt that the American "scheme will be carried through," in view of the reports
he had seen, he felt that the wisest course would be "to remain inactive for two
months or so" before taking any other initiatives.29 Not hearing anything further
from the Americans, Mellanby wrote again in September, that time to Vanevar
Bush, Conant's boss in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, urging
the same course and stressing that when another mission was proposed, it should be
ajoint enterprise.30
While it was Mellanby's understanding that Bush had accepted his counsel, the
Americans apparentlyreceivedconflicting signalsfromtheBritish. SirJohnAnderson,
LordPresident ofthePrivy Councilandthus Mellanby's superior, was inWashington
inJuly andAugust, and Conant andRichardsthoughtthattheyhadwonhis approval
of their plans. But when he returned to London and saw the reports ofthe mission,
Anderson had second thoughts and agreed that the Americans should shelve their
proposal until the foreign ministers' conference in October, when the Russians
"might ... become sweeter"..31
The Americans, however, in their determination to push the mission forward,
failed to discover, or chose to ignore, Anderson's change of heart, and in August
they made their first overture to the Russians. In late October the latter, after two
months of silence, accepted the proposal. Thus when Washington, a week later,
suddenly announced to the British that it was sending an American medical research
mission to Moscow as soon as possible, the British were caught totally off guard.
More distressing was the news that the mission was to be entirely an American show.
Bush assured Mellanby that the American ambassador had tried to get the Russians
to accept British and Canadian representation but that the Soviets said that their
invitation was for the Americans only, because "the Soviet Government had not
been requested to receive representatives from these [other] countries."32
Bush's announcement set off an uproar in London. In the Foreign Office, the
Americans were suddenly cast as villains. "It appears," said Foreign Office first
"' Wilson, Minute Sheet, 11 August 1943, N4481, FO 371/36929, PRO.
" C. F. A. Wamer to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 4 September 1943, N4738, FO 371/36929, PRO.
" MeJlanby to Conant, 10 August 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC. The Canadians, by contrast, urged the
Americans to go ahead with their plans. See C. J. MacKenzie to Conant, 17 July 1943, CMR, Gen
Rec, "Russ", RG 227.
" Mellanby to Bush, 29 September 1943, N5528, FO 371/36929, PRO.
81 n Anderson and his views see Melanby to Conant, 10 August 1943, f. 3132/4, MRC; A. N.
Richards, Memo, 11 August 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227; W. L. G. Barnes to A. R.
Dew, 19 August 1943, N4481, FO 371/36929, PRO; Warner to Gorell Barnes, 4 September 1943,
N4738, FO 371/36929, PRO.
" Bush to Mellanby, 7 November 1943, N6796, FO 371/36930, PRO.The firstAmericanproposal
was made on 19 August. American Embassy to Secretary ofState, CMR, Gen Rev. "Russ", RG 227.
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secretary A. R. Dew, who knew well both the Russians and Americans, "that the
Americans have blandly ignored the proposal made in Sir Edward Mellanby's letter
to Dr. Bush . .. and brushing aside the suggestion for a joint . .. approach have
gone ahead with their own proposal .... This is rather sharp practice."33 And not
just sharp, but larcenous as well, Mellanby thought, for much ofwhat the U.S. was
planning to give the Russians had been discovered by British scientists.
Mellanby was probably angrier than anyone over the prospect of the Americans
representing themselves in Moscow as the leaders ofWestern science, for in his mind
British medical research was far superior to American. Sometimes British visitors to
Washington had the temerity to rate U.S. research ahead of British efforts, and on
those occasions Mellanby was quick to offer rebuke. In 1942, his own liaison officer
sent home such a report, and Mellanby's response was swift and acid-edged. "I
think", he wrote to J. H. Burn, Professor of Pharmacology at Oxford, that "it is
important that you should return to England in the not too distant future, because
it would help you to keep a balanced judgment as to the relative value of some of
the work that is going on in the two countries.""
More troublesome to London than American bad manners and presumptiousness,
though, was the likelihood that if U.S. scientists went to Russia alone and were
successful in setting up a permanent medical exchange, which was after all their
main objective, the British would not be included. That would betotally unacceptable
to London, for it would not only put the two Western nations on an unequal footing
with a common ally, but also deny the British the Moscow contact they felt they
must have to open an information flow into and out of the U.S.S.R.35 Mellanby
voiced a common sentiment when he insisted that Britain must "put up some kind
of side against America . . . .".36 Accordingly, Whitehall instructed the British
ambassador in Moscow to tell the Soviets that Britain expected to be included in
any medical mission, for her representatives had, after all,joined in the proposal for
an expanded exchange the previous July.37
Although the British were convinced that the U.S. was trying to steal a march on
them, simple misunderstanding, coupled with American impatience, were more
likely explanations for Washington's handling ofthe matter. Bush's justification for
hurrying the mission was that the information they wanted to give to Russia, in-
formation theyhadofferednearlythree months before, would nothave muchmilitary
value ifthey held on to it any longer. Certainly, Bush, Conant, and their colleagues
in the CMR had no objection to the British joining the mission, if they could get
ready in time.88
u A. R. Dew, Minute Sheet, 12 November 1943, N6796, FO371/36930, PRO. On Dewsee Who's
Who, London, A. & C. Black, 1945, p. 731.
' Mellanby to Burn, 2 December 1942, f. 3151/2, MRC.
On the Allies' interest in having resident medical representatives in Moscow, see Carling to
C. F. A. Wamer, 4 December 1943, N7230, FO 371/36930, PRO.
" Mellanby to Burke, 29November 1943, N7118, FO 371/36930,PRO;ClementAttlee toAnthony
Eden, 10 November 1943, N6796, FO 371/36930, PRO.
"Ibid.
"Bush to Mellanby, 7 November 1943, N6796, FO 371/36930, PRO. There was possibly more to
the matter than Bush admitted at the time. He said later that it was neither war needs, nor interest
in out-distancing the British which underlay themission, but rather Bush's concernabout thebalance
of power in the post-war period. According to the Office of Scientific Research and Development
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The British had every intention ofdoing so, and the first step was to get Moscow's
approval. In December the Russians signalled their willingness to include the British,
so all that remained was for them to select their personnel and obtain visas.39 The
two men whom Mellanby mostwantedto send were Howard Florey and E. B. Chain,
theOxford scientists who had proventhe clinical value ofpenicillin.'0 Surely, Florey
and Chain could put up a "side against America" ifanyone could.
But right away there were difficulties. Chain's name, the Foreign Office believed,
had to be withdrawn because he, like Cade before him, was a naturalized British
subject. Ernst Boris Chain was born in Germany, and his father, Michael, had been
of Russian origin; these circumstances might make him unwelcome in Moscow.
Whitehall tried to secure the approval of a substitute, Dr. A. Gordon Sanders, the
distinguished bacteriologist from the Pathological Institute, University of Oxford,
to help Florey demonstrate the use ofpenicillin against burns and wounds. However,
the Russians replied that they could only grant one visa. Florey, who was already
dissatisfied about Chain's rejection, said that in that case he would not go.41
Meantime, the American delegation, comprised of A. Baird Hastings, a Harvard
physiologist and CMR member, and Michael Shimkin of the National Cancer
Institute, anAmencanofRussian birth, hadarrivedinLondonandwas soonpressing
to be off to Moscow, with or without the British. Hastings and Shimkin promised
not to discuss penicillin until Florey arrived, but the British did not see how that
would be possible. The two delegations must go to Moscow together.42
Despite London's efforts, that was not to be. The Americans left London on 17
December 1943. Florey and the now approved Sanders, though delayed in London
because of visa problems, did catch the Americans in Teheran. But then Florey
became ill with influenza, and he and Sanders had to stay behind for nearly a week
while Hastings and Shimkin proceeded alone to Moscow.'3
As itturned out, thatdelay caused noproblems, for arrangements in Moscowtook
several additional days and gave the British time to arrive. Once discussions did
begin, in January, it was immediately apparent that the 1944 mission was to be far
more successful than the surgeons' visit the summer before. The Russians were not
only more open to general discussions but also more willing to share their research
director, he proposed the mission to divert President Roosevelt from a plan to send Moscow some
highly secret weapons information, a disclosure Bush regarded as a foolish give-away ofAmerican
power. See Bush, Pieces ofthe action, New York, William Morrow, 1970, p. 140.
" Minute Sheet, 1 December 1943, N7118, FO 371/36930, PRO. Canada was not interested in
accompanying the second mission but wanted to be a part ofanyexcange arrangement.
" Mellanby to Burke, 29 November 1943, N7118, FO 371/36930, PRO. In 1945 Florey and Chain
shared theNobelPrizeinphysiologyormedicinewithAlexanderFleming. NobelLectures, Physiology
or Medicine, 1942-1962, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1964, pp. 96-145.
'1 OnChain see MinuteSheet, 1 December 1943, N7118, FO 371/36930,PRO, and FO to Moscow,
c. 11 Deber 1943, N7184, FO 371/36930, PRO; on the other problems see ibid. and FO to
Moscow, 3 December 1943, N7118, FO 371/36930, PRO.
"h Ibid. For some reason the Russians did not make an issue of Shimkin's origin. Perhaps they
did not know ofif, orperhaps itwassimplypredictable Russianunpredictability. Itwasalsoposible,
of course, that the British exaggerated Moscow's sensitivity on the issue.
" FO to Moscow, 17 December 1943, N7184, FO 371/36930, PRO; Florey to 0. W. Wilson,
22 December 1943, N7638, FO 371/36930, PRO; Teheran to FO, 29 December 1944, N7725, FO
371/36930, PRO. Problems in Teheran were noted in A. Baird Hastings to the author, 9 August
1977 and in Michael Shimkin to the author, 23 August 1977.
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and military medical experience. The latter information Britain and America par-
ticularly covetedjust then because oftheimpending European invasion, whichwould
confront the West with massive battlefield casualties for the first time. Perhaps the
Russians' new attitude was attributable merely to the whims of Soviet diplomacy.
Or, perhaps it sprang from the fact that by late 1943 the German invasion had begun
to crumble: with their survival no longer in doubt, the Soviets could finally begin
looking to the future and to ways that the West might help them contend with
accumulated problems in such areas as medicine and public health." But whatever
the reason, it was apparent to observers like Averill Harriman, the new American
ambassador in Moscow, that "the Soviets agreed to open up before the arrival of
Doctors Hastings and Shimkin and they did so with increasing frankness during the
course oftheir visit in Moscow."'4
In terms ofwinning its major aim, an ongoing medical exchange, the mission was
much less successful. While the Russians professed an interest in future sharing of
information, they were not willing to permit exchange on Soviet soil. If it were to
occur, it would have to take place inWashington and London, where representatives
of the Russian Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies would act as conduits of
information. In answer to British objections that such a plan would prevent any
dialogue between working scientists, the Soviets responded that they did not con-
template personal discussions ofresearch, only the exchange ofwritten reports.
Actually, the British knew what the Russians were going to propose shortly before
the mission left London, for Peoples' Commissar of Health Georgii Miterev (in
response to the July, 1943 proposal!) had informed theMRCthat secretsexchanged
would have to take place without a "special bureau" in Moscow.4" Mellanby had
hoped that once in Russia American and British scientists could convince the Soviets
to change their minds. But Miterev remained adamant, and as far as the British were
concerned, hopesforarealmedicalexchangewerefruitless.'7 ForeignOfficecounsellor
C. F. A. Warner reflected the general frustration when he observed that "the Soviet
authorities are clearly at their old game of keeping us aloof.""" Britain had sought
long andhard foraviablesharingarrangement withMoscow, butall theyhad gained
was Miterev's "one-sided arrangement".""
The Americans, incorrigible optimists when it came to Russia, took a different
view. They regarded Miterev's position as one that would surely yield to the right
amount of patience and goodwill, and in fact Hastings and Shimkin believed they
were on the threshold of a significant breakthrough as a result of the Moscow
"The U.S. and British interest in sharing Russia's battldfield experience is reflected in Richards'
Memo, 11 August 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227; as an example of Russian eagerness to
share Westem medical information about this time see V. V. Lebedenko to Kermit Roosevelt, jr.,
16 September 1943, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RO 227.
" Harriman's views are included in Confidential Memo, 19 February 1944, CMR, Gen Rec,
'"Russ,", RG 227.
"Carling to Warner, 4 Deceuber 1943, N7230, FO 371/36930, PRO.
"See Mellanby to Lord President of the Privy Counci, 27 January 1944, N644, FO 371/43342;
also Minute Sheet, 19 January 1944, N424, FO 371/43342; on the defects of Russia's proposal see
E. M. Wilson, 5 February 1944, N644, FO 371/43342. All are in the PRO.
-i C. F. A. Warner, 8 February 1944, N644, FO 371/43342, PRO. On Warner see Who's Who,
London, A. & C. Black, 1945 p. 2842.
" Minute Sheet, 19 January 1944, N424, FO 371/43342, PRO.
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meetings. To exploit that possibility Hastings, with Harriman's concurrence, cabled
the State Department from Moscow that it should immediately invite Vasilii Parin,
Vice-Commissar of Public Health, to the U.S. on a return mission. In addition, the
CMR should make plans to send a top American scientist to Moscow for several
months. Until such a representative arrived, Hastings urged that Commander F. R.
Lang, a physician assigned to the U.S. Military Mission in Moscow, be named as
CMR agent to keep in touch with Russian research and to act as the medium of
exchange between the two countries.50
For a while there were signs that Hastings' approach might pay off. Lang did
gain access to some Russianlaboratories andsent anumber ofreports to Washington,
until he returned to the U.S. inthe summer of1944. In addition, nine Soviet scientists
came to the U.S. on brief visits that year to inspect work in progress at various
research facilities like the Mayo Clinic. But Parin, whose visit was to signal the
beginning of a regular and permanent exchange, never came. The Russians kept
delaying his departure until, in November 1944, they postponed it indefinitely. With
no-one having been named to replace Lang in Moscow, routine interchange had
stopped the previous summer.51
Hastings and his colleagues in the CMR, however, were not willing to let the
matter rest. Convinced of the military value of medical exchange and looking now
to the post-war period, when international collaboration in medicine would, it was
hoped, serve the cause of peace, Hastings, Richards, and Bush determined to try
to revive Soviet-American exchange, again by sending experts to the U.S.S.R.52
Accordingly, in the early months of 1945 the CMR made a careful search for the
right men. By early April a mission was ready, and that time its constitution would
be exclusively American, the British apparently having decided to end what they
regarded as a futile Russian courtship. U.S. participants included old hand Michael
Shinkin, University ofMinnesota surgeon Owen Wangensteen, and Harvard physio-
logist Eugene Landis. If admitted to the Soviet Union, they were prepared to give
anup-to-date report ontopics coveredtheprevious year, plus information on matters
such as blood preservation, clinical uses of antimalarial drugs, and the effects of
decompression and anoxia. Besides information exchange, the mission was prepared
to stay in Russia for several months to provide continuous liaison. On 17 April
Bush cabled Harriman the details, asking him to seek permission for the mission's
entry, but giving him leeway to modify it as he thought best.53
On 5 May, following assurances from Bush that the Russians had honoured most
ofthe previous year's promises in the matter ofexchange, Harriman forwarded the
American proposal to the Soviet Foreign Office. A month later the Russians told
Harriman that it was under consideration. After that, Moscow was silent. Near the
° The contents of Hastings' cable of 6 February are in Bush to Franklin S. Cooper, 8 February
1944, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227.
1A. B. Hastings to Richards, 19 January 1945, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227; also see D. C.
BalfourtoRichards, 7 March 1945, CMR,GenRec, "Russ", RG 227. OnParin's visit seeNormanT.
Kirk to Richards, 18 April 1944 and Hastings to Bush, 3 November 1944, both in CMR, Gen Rec,
"Russ", RG 227.
Il Richards to H. S. Diehl, 18 March 1945, CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227. In the same file see
Bush to Thomas Parin, 21 March, 1945, and Hastings to Richards, 19 January 1945.
"' 'Memo on second mission to Russia', [n.d.], CMR, Gen Rec, "Russ", RG 227.
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war's end, the American scientists who had been holding themselves ready to go to
Russia "at a moment's notice" were simply told that the "interchange had been
called off, and without explanation"."
Thus ended the long and largely futile search for co-operation from the Russian
ally in the exchange ofmedical information. Efforts, ofcourse, had not been entirely
fruitless. Butwhatexchange therewas flowedlargely in onedirection only, fromWest
to East. Inthe West, continuous sharing on aface to face basis was takenforgranted
as the most efficient method ofputting information to work for the Allied cause. But
in Russia, ideals of openness, generous giving, and free inquiry were alien notions,
andthe Soviets preferredto reject the aidofWesternmedicineiftheprice ofthat help
was the presence in the U.S.S.R. ofWesterners themselves.
That rejection, though, came at the price of increased Russian suffering and loss
oflife. Edward Mellanby was one who observed the cost ofthe Soviet obsession for
isolation. Commenting at the time of the 1944 mission on the great value of the
information then being given to the Russians, Mellanby noted that much of it
"could have been sent to Russia months or even years ago," ifthe Russian medical
delegate had accepted the Medical Research Council's invitation in 1942 to "sit in on
its meetings and read its reports."55 But he did not, and the cost was surely high.
SUMMARY
Throughout World War II Britain and the U.S., in an effort to strengthen the
Eastern Front, attempted to bring the Soviet Union within their system of medical
research exchange. Except for a brief period in 1944, however, Western leaders
found the Soviets unwilling to participate in any on-going interchange, even though
Russian civilians faced severe health problems throughout the war which could
have been ameliorated by such sharing ofinformation.
The basis of the Soviet objection was the West's desire to establish a permanent
liaison office in Moscow, to provide continuing research exchange. Not only did the
Russians not want foreign scientists permanently residing on Soviet soil, but they
refused even to discuss whole areas of medicine and health, like the question of
typhus (which was reportedly out ofcontrol in parts of Russia).
Despite the many Russian rebuffs, the U.S. and Britain continued to try for an
exchange agreement. In 1943 and again in 1944 Allied medical missions actually
went to Moscow, and at the end of the war the U.S. was trying unsuccessfully to
send a third. In their eagerness to bring the Soviets into a sharing arrangement, U.S.
and British scientists often worked at cross purposes and in competition with one
another, which produced much ill feeling.
The story of wartime medical research exchange is instructive in its relevation of
underlying tensions within the Anglo-American alliance and in its depiction of a
Soviet ally which preferred to risk the health ofits own soldiers and civilians rather
than open its doors to onlookers from the West.
" Owen H. Wangensteen to the author, 26 July 1977. On American Embassy (Moscow) handli
of the proposal see George Kennan to Secretary of State, 23April 1945; Bush to Harriman, 3 May
1945; Keiman to Secretary ofState, 10 May 1945; and Harriman to secretary ofState, 8 June 1945,
all in CMR, Gen Rec, "Russia-Proposed Second Russian Mission" file, RG 227.
"Mellanby to Lord President ofthe Privy Council, 27 January 1944, N644, FO 371/43342, PRO.
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